By Born, Hans Born, Marina Caparini
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From Publishers Weekly Former CIA director guiding principle leaves the most vocal tasks for this audio within the able fingers of Conger (who additionally lately narrated *The Reagan Diaries*). but in analyzing either the short creation and lengthy-but hugely compelling-afterword, guiding principle demonstrates a command of the spoken notice that makes one ask yourself why he didn't deal with his personal narration.
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Extra resources for Democratic Control of Intelligence Services
3). Functional vs Institutional Oversight Often oversight and accountability are established on specific institutional grounds. That is, legislation mandating oversight refers directly to it occurring with regard to a specific institution, rather than on a functional basis. The problem is that as responsibility for national security becomes increasingly fragmented among many types of government agencies, institutions and departments, the oversight framework may remain tied to a specific institution, while the others escape mandated review or oversight.
Citizens, civil society groups and other non-state actors are considered part of vertical accountability mechanisms because they have much less power relative to state actors to influence the target institutions because of the state’s control over the means of coercion, resources and means of communication. The vertical accountability process may be top–down, as in the case of principals controlling (having the capacity to determine the actions of) agents in a bureaucracy, or bottom–up, as in the case of citizens holding their elected representatives accountable at election time (Schedler, 1999, p.
Developments in the intelligence policy and practice of numerous democratic states since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have underscored the necessity of retaining their commitment to foundational democratic norms and core values whilst seeking to protect their societies from those who would destroy those norms and values. The attacks of 9/11 instigated an immediate drive among Western governments to implement measures to protect the public safety and national security of their states. In the continuing aftermath of 9/11 in which the Global War on Terror (GWOT) or the ‘Long War’ is being waged against the perceived threat of international jihadist terrorism, there are significant grounds for doubting whether legal safeguards and oversight and review mechanisms have kept pace with the developing methods and capacities of the intelligence community.
Democratic Control of Intelligence Services by Born, Hans Born, Marina Caparini