By Robert C. Owen
Does most probably endured U.S. involvement in counterinsurgencies demand including really good airplane, education, or different assets to the final airlift fleet? generally, present U.S. airlift forces can accomplish such a lot such missions successfully. yet persisted operations most probably would require reinforcement of the final airlift fleet and, probably acquisition of a small fleet point optimized for sure counterinsurgency missions.
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Additional resources for Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations
Airlift and Counterinsurgency 9 residual guerilla forces while exploiting the improving security situation to eﬀect political and economic reforms. In the end, counterinsurgent governments hope to gain or regain legitimacy in the eyes of formerly restive population groups. 6 Thus, there are potentially two broad phases of counterinsurgent military operations, paralleling the phases of insurgency. If the insurgents mass their forces according to the traditional prescription, the conventional phase of counterinsurgency aims to defeat the ﬁelded insurgent forces and large guerilla bands to destroy their ability to challenge the government for control of territory and political legitimacy in open battle.
It changes the options available to counterinsurgencies in everything from basic strategy to operational timing to rules of engagement; in turn, the use of airlift is shaped by the strategic nature of the conﬂict. Operationally, counterinsurgency airlift diﬀers in its major features from conventional airlift mainly in that it calls for closer civil-military coordination and somewhat greater ﬁnesse in base selection. Otherwise, the planning and operational issues raised for airlift planners by counterinsurgencies diﬀer from those of other conﬂicts only in degree and focus, when they diﬀer at all.
The United States was the ﬁrst to use helicopters in urban battles, during the Vietnam War. But Israel, South Africa, Great Britain, and many other countries soon followed. Even in the most built-up areas, such open areas as streets, rooftops, parks, and vacant lots provided endless opportunities for helicopters to land near or even amidst engaged troops. Their relatively small payloads were not usually a problem, given the modest requirements of MOUT forces for assault airlift, resupply, medical evacuation, and reinforcement.
Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations by Robert C. Owen